I. Introduction
With the widespread use of mobile devices, wireless roaming is rapidly becoming an important network feature. To provide effective global roaming service for a legitimate mobile user between the home network and a visited foreign network, strong authentication measures are required. When a mobile user (MU) roams to a foreign network, it performs authentication and updates its registration information with its home agent (HA) in the home network, either directly or indirectly. A session key is set up to encrypt further communication in the session between the MU and its foreign agent (FA) in the visited foreign network if the authentication is successful.
Identity anonymity is an important property for roaming services. The disclosure of a user identity may allow unauthorized entities to track his movement history and current Manuscript [3] showed that Lee's protocol does not provide identity anonymity and perfect backward secrecy. They also proposed an improved protocol to repair the security flaws. However, in this letter, we demonstrate that the improved protocol still cannot achieve perfect identity anonymity, contrary to some of the security claims which have been made concerning them. We then present a simple patch which fixes the security problem.
II. Review of Wu's Protocol
For convenience, the abbreviations and notations used in this letter are shown in Table 1 . Wu's wireless authentication protocol [3] is claimed to be an improvement of Lee's authentication protocol [2] and to provide user anonymity. The protocol includes three phases. In phase I, the HA delivers a password and a smart card for the MU through a secure channel. In phase II, mutual authentication between the MU and an FA is provided through his or her HA. After successful validation, a session key is established, and the MU can obtain service from the FA. In phase III, the MU renews his or her session key with the FA.
Phase I: Initiation
When an MU registers with his or her HA, the MU's identity ID MU is submitted to the HA. Then, the HA delivers the password PW MU and a smart card that contains ID HA , r, and h(·) to the MU through a secure channel. We calculate PW MU and r as ( )
where N is a long random number kept secretly by the HA.
Phase II: Mutual Authentication
In this phase, a mutual authentication between an MU and an FA is performed. The steps of this phase are the following (see Fig. 1 
.
III. Security Weakness in Wu's Protocol
In mobile networks, to prevent unauthorized entities from tracking a mobile user's movements and current whereabouts (which may be a serious violation of privacy), it is important to assure user anonymity so that the user's real identity can only be recognized by the user's HA, while others can only refer to the user by a pseudonym.
In this section, we demonstrate that Wu's improved protocol [3] With this modification, the message n MU sent by the MU in each run of the protocol becomes bounded to the identity ID MU and N MU of the MU; therefore, such an attack as that previously presented would be impossible.
V. Conclusion
In this letter, we demonstrated that Wu's wireless authentication protocol [3] fails to provide perfect identity anonymity, and it is easy to extend the result to the original versions [1] , [2] . We have also demonstrated how to fix the protocol to ensure that it is robust against attacks.
